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JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU.
« (1712-1778.)
BY PROFESSOR L. L^VY-BRUHL.
ROUSSEAU'S personality exhibits so much complexity and yet
at the same time so much unity that it is no easy thing to
study in him the philosopher apart from the man of letters. His
philosophical tenets are the very soul of his talent as a writer.
They are not merely the result of his mind's reflexions upon the
great problems, but rather of his heart's inmost tendencies. Rous-
seau the philosopher is Rousseau's entire self. Yet this very fact
gives to his philosophical doctrine, if we try to examine it sep-
arately, a certain character of unity. His solutions of the essen-
tial questions are in harmony with one another, and it is not im-
possible to discover the general principles from which all the rest
springs.
The chief philosophical problem, according to Rousseau, is
the moral problem from the two-fold point of view of the individ-
ual and of society. He feels but little curiosity for theoretical
questions, properly so called. Though a subtle and sometimes
rigorous dialectician, it never occurs to him to reflect upon logic.
Exact sciences have but little interest for him. The strong liking
for botany which he manifested in his later years came from an
aesthetic, and, in a certain sense, religious feeling.
On the other hand, everything relating to man's conduct and
destiny moved him deeply. He was led to philosophical reflexion
by the discomfort, suffering, and often indignation bred in him
either by his intercourse with other men, or by the sight of men's
intercourse with one another. Morals, institutions, and beliefs
all hurt him, and appeared to him false, and different from what
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they should be. Whence comes it that the immense majority of
men are sunk in poverty, in order to maintain in luxury the few
who in their turn suffer from having no rule of life and nothing
more to desire ? Whence comes it that the weak and the power-
ful are equally dependent upon one another, and equally unhappy ?
Why do we find, lurking beneath the apparent refinement and
mildness of manners, the cold rage of envy, base covetousness,
desperate pursuit of personal interest, indifference to public good,
hardness of heart, and cruelty? Why does the development of
arts and sciences, notwithstanc^ing the excellence of a few individ-
uals, seem to have made mankind worse and more miserable still?
And, lastly, why is hypocrisy universal, making it possible for
Rousseau to appear original merely because he said what was as
clear as daylight to everybody? In short, to reduce all these ques-
tions to two essential ones : is it necessary that man and society
should be what they are? If we can conceive the possibility of
their being otherwise, by what means can man be brought back to
truth, virtue, and happiness?
To the first of these two questions there is a very simple an-
swer, supplied by Christian theology. Man fell through sin. His
nature is corrupt, and it is not a surprising thing that what springs
from such a nature should be corrupt also. Rousseau did not con-
tent himself with this appeal to mystery. Had he done so, he
might have been a more orthodox Christian, but his effect upon his
contemporaries would have been far less great, and he might have
had none whatever. How could the theological solution be pro-
posed again to minds feverishly longing for enfranchisement, and
impatient to apply reason to the treatment of those subjects which
theology had kept to itself for so many centuries? And then, had
he borrowed his argument from the doctrine of the fall of man,
what could he have said on morals that had not been well said al-
ready by Nicole and Malebranche? Instead of simply taking
human perversity as a fact, Rousseau, by a stroke of genius, set
himself to the study of its genesis. Instead of supposing it to be
innate, he sought to discover how it was acquired. "All you can
see is man in the hands of the Devil," he writes to the Archbishop
of Paris; "but I see how he came there. The cause of evil, ac-
cording to you, is man's corrupt nature ; but this corruption is
itself an evil, and what ought to have been done was to seek its
cause. We both agree that man was created good, hut yeu say he
is wicked because he has been wicked, while / demonstrate how
he came to be wicked. In short, according to Rousseau, the
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dogma of original sin is not so much a solution as a statement of
the problem. He attempted to supply a real solution and to offer
an explanation instead of a dogma.
The undertaking was a bold one, and characteristic of the age
which asserted that in man "everything is acquired," and which,
in its desire to set the individual man wholly free from all sense of
solidarity with his fellows, except in so far as he himself freely ac-
cepted it, endeavored with Condillac and Helvetius to belittle
and even to deny the influence of heredity. In the same way,
Rousseau attacked the formidable problem of the origin of evil in
the human soul, still unsolved save in religious metaphysics, with-
out stopping to ask himself whether it was not beyond the reach of
his reason. That reason set the problem, was for him sufficient
ground for believing that reason was capable of solving it. Though
Rousseau was an adversary of the philosophers and out of pa-
tience with their misuse of reason, it did not occur to him, any
more than to them, to submit reason itself to criticism and to
measure its power.
* *
The search for the genesis of moral and social evil implies
that man was once innocent and good. If we thus admit a "con-
tradiction" (a word Rousseau was wont to use with the meaning of
"opposition") between man's primitive nature and our social or-
der, we shall see that it is sufficient to explain all the vices of men
and the evils of society.
But it is no light task to discern what is original and what is
artificial in the present nature of man. How can we know his
"primitive state, which exists no longer, may never have existed,
will probably never exist again, but of which, however, we must
have some precise notions in order to judge rightly of our present
state?" We see that Rousseau does not for a moment claim for
his researches the character of historical investigations. He makes
no pretension to anthropological science. He does not even seek
to discover what primitive man may actually have been. The gen-
esis he undertakes to seek is an analytical one, like those attempted
in psychology by Diderot, Condillac, and Buffon, to which the pub-
lic had given a very favorable recej^tion. Just as Condillac, in
tracing cur knowledge back to its first elements, did not have re-
course to direct observation, but, by a sort of ideal analysis, elim-
inated imaginatively all the senses save one, in order to establish
the special data of that one, after which he brought back the other
senses one by one, so Rousseau proceeds, as he himself says, by
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means of 'hypothetical and conditional" reasoning. He first con-
siders the nature of man as he now is, and determines all that may
be explained by the influence of social intercourse, of surround-
ings, education, etc. Then, suppressing all that is thus explained,
he infers that what remains must have been the original nature
of man.
Those who objected that Rousseau's "man in a state of na-
ture " had never existed, failed therefore very egregiously to under-
stand him. It is as if one should object that Condillac's animated
statue never existed. Rousseau's method is quite a psychological
one. It was "by meditating upon the first and simplest operations
of the soul " that he endeavored to deduce the feelings and ideas
of the natural man. Nature, whose voice cannot be completely
hushed, was to tell him, by means of an inward feeling, whether
his hypotheses were acceptable. He had in her a means, if not
of verification, at least of control.
* *
In order to separate at once from man's present nature all that
the successive generations have acquired in the course of the cen-
turies, Rousseau supposes the original man to have lived alone.
Even the family did not yet exist : it was a first revolution that
brought about the establishment of families, and the distinctions
between them. Originally man did not live in society any more
than wolves and monkeys do ; he occasionally joined his fellow-
creatures, but usually kept aloof from them. He was an animal,
inferior in certain respects to some but upon the whole supe-
rior to all others. His body was robust, and mainly unacquainted
with other ills than wounds and old age. The innumerable dis-
eases to which civilised man is a prey were unknown to men in a
state of nature ; moreover, as the sway of natural selection was un-
disputed among them, every weak and deficient individual, not
being able to get beyond childhood, was eliminated at the outset.
As regards his mind, his first state, in common with all animals,
must have been that of simple perception and feeling to will and
to be unwilling, to desire and to fear,—these must have been the
first and almost the only operations of his soul. He felt no curios-
ity, and his mind stagnated indefinitely. As he wandered through
the forests, without industry and without speech, neither at war
with his kind nor bound by any ties to them, having no need of his
fellow-creatures and at the same time no desire to harm them, he
had only so much feeling and enlightenment as belongs to such a
state ; there could be no education and no progress. The species
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was already old, and man remained still a child. His only passion
was the love of his own person (not self-love which supposes a
distinction between personal interest and the interest of others,
that is, of society). He had a natural inclination to pity, when he
beheld one of his fellow-beings in distress. , '
But this harmless animal, apparently so nearly like the others,
had that within him which could create between him and them an
almost boundless difference. He was "perfectible." He pos-
sessed the potentiality of reason, and of everything that comes in
its train : language, civil society, morality, and progress. The
difificulty is to understand how the solitary man became sociable,
and what started that extraordinary evolution, of which modern
societies are the outgrowth. Rousseau confesses that the transi-
tion puzzles him ; he has recourse to "the spur of necessity, " to
the presence of want, occasioned apparently by the increase of
population. How did man begin to think? " The more we med-
itate upon this subject, the greater the distance between pure sen-
sations and the most simple form of knowledge" appears. And
how are we to explain the origin of language ? Rousseau thinks
the problem insoluble; he does not know which was the more in-
dispensable prerequisite for the creation of the other, a society al-
ready in operation or a language already invented.
Having reached this point, the author sketches a sort of hypo-
thetical pre-histor}', in which man, having once left the state of
nature behind him, is constantly led on to new inventions by new
wants. His intelligence and sensibility developed, the family is
constituted, and groups of families are formed ; common tradition,
knowledge, and beliefs are established. Finally, when the last
traces of the state of nature are obliterated, the idea of property
appears. This idea, dependent as it is upon many other previous
ideas, which could have arisen only one after another, was not
formed all at once in the human mind : many improvements had
to be made and much industry and enlightment to be acquired
before it could occur to men.
Property implies the organisation of civil society, of penal jus-
tice, and the legal recognition of inequality. Henceforth there
must be rich men and poor men ; and, by a prodigious piece of
dexterity, those who have possessions have managed to get their
wealth insured and protected by those who have none. Soon there
will be powerful men and weak men, and in the end masters and
slaves. Inequality thus reaches its last stage. In the state of na-
ture men were all equal, save for a few physical differences, since
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they all led the same peaceful and solitary life. In the present
state some are starving while others are wallowing in superfluous
wealth, and all become crafty, jealous, and wicked.
But, one might object, was it not by virtue of his very nature
that man developed his reason, and gradually formed the family,
property, and civil society? If the social man existed as a germ or
potentiality within the original man, is it fair to oppose them to
each other? Rousseau forestalled the objection. Such an evolu-
tion, he says, was not inevitable. It might possibly not have taken
place. Nature had but meagerly endowed men for sociability.
She had very little share in all that they did to make fast its bonds.
She had made him rather for solitude. Perfectibility, social vir-
tues, and all other potentialities which the natural man had re-
ceived could never have developed of themselves ; they needed
the chance conjunction of several causes which might never have
occurred; man would then have remained forever in his primitive
condition. But when once this evolution had begun, and, above
all, when once society had been established, every step taken
brought man farther from his original type.
Thus the long toil of civilisation, which gave us arts, sciences,
and industry, also brought upon us diseases, misery, sufferings of
all kinds, and especially vices. Society is an assemblage of artifi-
cial men, preyed upon by factitious, though only too real, passions,
for which in the primitive state there was no occasion. Therefore,
if man's nature is now corrupted, we must not infer therefrom that
it has always been so. This corruption is his own work, and the
ransom to be paid for his release from savagery.
Thus did Rousseau solve the first problem he had set himself,
and trace the genesis of social evil. Where are we to seek a remedy
for it? This remedy, if it exists, can be found only in a system of
education that would rehabilitate man depraved by the morals and
institutions of to-day. But such a system of education implies a
whole system of philosophy, for it presupposes a thorough knowl-
edge of man's nature, of the laws of his mental development, of his
private and public intercourse with his fellow-creatures, of his
place in nature, of his future destiny, and lastly, of the first cause
of all things. This philosophy Rousseau was to undertake, and
the idea of " nature " as opposed to everything fictitious or conven-
tional, was to be the clue that he followed in his researches.
*
* *
Knowing what was the state of nature, which man has left for-
ever, knowing what his present social state is, and what it ought to
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be, what education ought man to receive ? What is he to be
taught, and how ?
As a principle, education should be national and public. There
lies the essential cause of the "superhuman grandeur" of Sparta.
There are opened the ways unknown to the moderns, by which the
ancients brought men to such fortitude and patriotic zeal as are
unexampled among ourselves, but the germs of which are in the
hearts of all men. To train citizens is not the work of a day, and
in order to have men good citizens, they must be taught when
children, and accustomed from their earliest years to regard them-
selves only as members of the State, and to consider their own ex-
istence, so to speak, as part of that of the State. Evidently this
can be obtained only by public education entirely directed to this
object. Public education is, therefore, one of the fundamental
maxims of popular and right government.
But as nothing is more unlike Sparta than the States of the
eighteenth century, our ambition shall not be to train citizens, and
we shall turn from the question of public control. We must limit
our task, which even then will be difficult enough, to preventing
the social man from being entirely artificial. '' Conformity with
nature" is the motto of Rousseau's pedagogy. In accordance with
this principle, he advises mothers to suckle their children them-
selves ; in devotion to the same principle he waits, before speak-
ing of religion to his pupil, till the latter is able to understand the
twofold revelation of conscience and of the universe. The good
teacher is he who assumes no other function than to present mat-
ters in such a way that the lessons of experience may be clear,
striking, and calculated to produce a durable impression upon the
child's mind. He leaves it to nature to educate by degrees the
child's senses, understanding, and conscience ; he sometimes en-
courages nature, but never forestalls her. Thus the child escapes
the many prejudices insidiously instilled into his mind by the cus-
tomary methods of education, which are afterwards so difficult to
eradicate.
Thus, Emile shall not be a man made by man; he shall be
one made by Nature. This does not involve making him a sav-
age, or confining him in the depths of the forests; but, though ab-
sorbed in the vortex of society, we ask only that he be not led
away by man's passions or opinions ; that he see with his own
eyes, feel with his own heart, be governed by no authority save his
own reason. To be one's self : nothing is more rare, difficult, and
even impossible, unless one has been prepared for it from child-
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hood. As soon as he is born, man is wrapped in swaddling
clothes; when dead, he is sewed up in a shroud; all his life long,
he is pinioned by laws, manners, and customs, decorum, and pro-
fessional obligations. Nobody ever suffered more than did Rous-
seau from social tyranny and hypocrisy ; nor did any cry of revolt
ever echo so far and so long as the cry he uttered against them.
Does this mean that he dreams of bringing man back to his
primitive state? Certainly not, for there is a wide difference "be-
tween the natural man living in a state of nature, and the natural
man living in a state of society." The latter must adapt himself to
his situation. He is a " savage intended for life in towns." He
must therefore receive a systematic education, and be instructed in
all accomplishments. Mingling with other men, he must learn to
live not like them, but with them. Our race does not like to be
half finished. In the present state of things, a man left to himself
among other men would be the most distorted of all. Whence it
follows that in a well regulated republic, the State owes to every
man not only the possibility of living by his own work, but also
such education as will make of him a free man and a good citizen.
No philosopher, and, more broadly speaking, no writer for a
century past, has had an influence comparable to that of Rousseau.
But the very strength and durability of this influence, which is still
deeply felt in our times, has often prevented him from being stud-
ied and judged with impartiality. He has enthusiastic admirers
and intense opponents, and both sides have maintained legends
often very far from true. Thus many people still believe that to
Rousseau must in an especial manner be ascribed the responsi-
bility for the excesses committed during the Revolution, and that
the worst terrorists were inspired chiefly by his doctrines. But the
responsibility of Rousseau in this connexion is neither greater nor
less than that of other philosophers of the eighteenth century, and
he even contributed, as Auguste Comte clearly perceived, to bring
on the religious reaction which combated these very philosophers.
The error may have arisen from the fact that other French philos-
ophers, from motives of policy, met the temporal power with def-
erence and with flattery, whereas Rousseau, being a Genevese
citizen, boasted of his republican feelings. But for all that he is
not a revolutionary spirit. On the contrary, he counselled polit-
ical moderation and prudence. Even the unhappy Poles who were
on the point of perishing he exhorted not to lay their hands rashly
upon their national constitution, and he predicts most profound
misfortunes for the French if they try to change the institutions
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under which they have lived for so many centuries. Though the
inequalities of fortune are monstrous, though "the demon of prop-
erty pollutes whatever it touches," yet Rousseau does not mean to
lay hands on vested rights, and it is in the future only that he per-
ceives means of opposing the ever-increasing social inequality.
But, having said this much, we must acknowledge that Rous-
seau's philosophy was big with consequences. The opposition
between what is natural and what is artificial, which is its leading
idea, was apt to lead minds in love with logic and justice a very
great way if applied to every aspect of human life. This oppo-
sition was, of course, not discovered by Rousseau ; it had been
known ever since there had been moralists ; and especially since
the beginning of the eighteenth century, the "good savage" and
"nature" had been quite in fashion. Rousseau's achievement lies
in making of this opposition the principle of a whole moral and
social doctrine, and of finding therein a means of distinguishing
between what is and what ought to be, by declaring nature to be
good, and evil to have sprung from human conventions. There-
fore, if the evils under which we labor are of social origin, the find-
ing of remedies depends upon us. For this it is sufficient to "see
with our eyes, to feel with our hearts, and to judge with our
reason"; to free ourselves from traditional preconceptions and
prejudices. We shall then plan for man, not a chimerical return
to an impracticable state of nature, but a social organisation more
in conformity with order and justice.
The very foundation principles of the present state of society
are thus called into question. The lawfulness of individual prop-
erty, the excessive inequality of fortunes, the sovereignty of the
people, the reciprocal rights and duties of the individual and the
State, the relation between the Church and political powers, are so
many problems proposed by Rousseau in such a way that it became
thenceforth impossible not to take an interest in them. He thought
the solutions more simple and easy than they really are : witness
the "civil religion" he wished to establish in the name of the
State, which was often so entirely misunderstood. But the thought
that led him to ask these questions was after all just, and many of
his ideas were original and suggestive. In spite of his connexion
with the "philosophers," he really follows none of them; how
many others, friends and adversaries, have followed him !
